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Resumo: O problema de Localização da Instalações é um problema de otimiza-
ção combinatória NP-Difícil bem conhecido na literatura. Ele modela uma gama de
situações onde se pretende fornecer um conjunto de bens ou serviços através de um
conjunto de instalações F para um conjunto de clientes T, também denominados ter-
minais. Há custos de abertura para cada instalação em F e custos de conexão para cada
par de instalações e clientes (f,t), onde a instalação f atende o cliente t. Uma autori-
dade central busca determinar uma solução com um custo mínimo, considerando os
custos de abertura e conexão, de tal maneira que todos os clientes sejam supridos por
uma instalação. Nesta resenha literária, estamos interessados na versão de jogo não
cooperativa desse problema, em que, em vez de existir uma autoridade central, cada
cliente é um jogador e decide em qual instalação se conectar. Ao escolher a instalação,
cada cliente pretende minimizar seus próprios custos, dado pelos custos de conexão
e custos de abertura da instalação, que podem ser compartilhados entre os clientes
que usam a mesma instalação. Este problema é relevante a várias aplicações práticas,
especialmente em cenários distribuídos, onde uma autoridade central é muito dispen-
diosa ou impossível de existir. Neste artigo, apresentamos uma resenha da literatura
existente descrevendo diferentes variantes desse problema e revisando vários resulta-
dos sobre eles, além de adaptar os resultados da literatura existente sobre a existência
de equilíbrio, Preço da Anarquia e Preço de Estabilidade. Também destacamos alguns
problemas em aberto que ainda não foram abordados na literatura.
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Abstract: The Facility Location problem is a well-know NP-Hard combinatorial
optimization problem. It models a diverse set of situations where one aims to provide
a set of goods or services via a set of facilities F to a set of clients T , also called
terminals. There are opening costs for each facility in F and connection costs for
each pair of facility and client, if such facility attends this client. A central authority
wants to determine the solution with minimum cost, considering both opening and
connection costs, in such a way that all clients are attended by one facility. In this
survey we are interested in the non-cooperative game version of this problem, where
instead of having a central authority, each client is a player and decides where to con-
nect himself. In doing so, he aims to minimize his own costs, given by the connection
costs and opening costs of the facility, which may be shared among clients using the
same facility. This problem has several applications as well, specially in distributed
scenarios where a central authority is too expensive or even infeasible to exist. In this
paper we present a survey describing different variants of this problem and reviewing
several results about it, as well as adapting results from existing literature concerning
the existence of equilibria, Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability. We also point out
open problems that remain to be addressed.
Palavras-chave: Teoria de jogos algorítmica, localização de instalações, preço
da anarquia, preço da estabilidade.
Keywords: Algorithmic game theory, facility location, price of anarchy, price of
stability.
1 Introduction
The facility location class of problems models a large number of important decision
problems that may occur in practice, ranging from traditional areas such as economics and
urban planning, to more recent ones such as computer networking. This class of problems
is concerned with the placement of facilities that will supply some demand of products or
services by clients in order to minimize some cost function. This cost function may be defined
in different ways, depending on each specific problem. Generally the costs consider several
factors such as competitors, distance from clients, and others.
A common version of the facility location problem can be stated as the problem of
choosing from a set of facilities F , a subset of facilities to open and to establish a connection
with each client from a set of clients T , also called terminals. The opening and connection
costs must be minimized. A formal definition is given bellow.
Definition 1 (Uncapacitated Facility Location Problem). Let F be a set of facilities, T a
set of terminals, cf opening costs for each facility f ∈ F and dtf connection costs for
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connecting terminal t ∈ T to facility f ∈ F . The problem is to find a subset of facilities to
open and establish connections from terminals to this subset such that the sum of all costs are
minimized.













xtf = 1 , ∀t ∈ T
yf ≥ xtf , ∀f ∈ F,∀t ∈ T
yf , xtf ∈ {0, 1} , ∀f ∈ F,∀t ∈ T ,
where yf is a binary variable that indicates if a facility f is opened, while the binary variable
xtf represents whether terminal t is connected to facility f or not.
From this problem, several possible variants may arise. There might be capacities
associated with each facility, as well as quotas for each facility. Furthermore, the opening
costs of a facility f may not be constant, but depend on the number of terminals connected
to f . In another possible variant the facilities can be any point in a metric space, i.e. F is
infinite. All these variants mentioned and the original problem are well studied, with most of
them being NP-Hard with known approximation algorithms [1, 2].
In all these problems, it is assumed that both terminals (clients) and facilities are
controlled by a single central entity seeking to minimize the total cost of the system. However,
in several applications, the terminals or the clients may behave differently, for example being
controlled by different agents. It is therefore important to analyse these problems from a
game theoretic perspective.
In game theory, a non–cooperative game is a scenario where players or agents choose
strategies independently trying to either minimize their costs or maximize their utility. For
each player i there is a set Ai of actions that it can choose to play. A pure strategy Si consists
of one action from Ai, while a mixed strategy corresponds to a probability distribution over
Ai. In a pure game each player choses one action to play, while in a mixed game each player
randomizes his action according to the probability distribution. In this survey we assume
pure strategies games unless mentioned otherwise. A set of strategies S = (S1, S2, . . . , Sn)
consisting of one strategy for each player, is denominated a strategy profile. Let S = A1 ×
A2 × . . . × An be the set of all possible strategy profiles and let c : S → Rn be a cost
function that attributes a cost ci(S) for each player i given a strategy profile S. Define
S−i = (S1, . . . , Si−1, Si+1, . . . , Sn) a strategy profile S without i’s strategy, so that we
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can write S = (Si, S−i). If all players other than i decide to play S−i, then player i is faced
with the problem of determining a best response to S−i. A strategy S∗i from a player i is a




i , S−i) ≤ ci(Si, S−i) ,∀Si ∈ Ai.
A strategy profile is in a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) if no player can increase his utility or
reduce his cost by choosing a different strategy, i.e. for each player, its strategy in the strategy
profile is a best response.
Game theory can be used to analyze many aspects of decision problems. It may be
used to help design games with desired properties, or be used to measure the inefficiency
arising from players selfish behaviour. The social welfare or social cost is a function mapping
a strategy profile to a real number, indicating a measure of the total cost or payoff of a game.
In a facility location game it can be defined as the cost of the solution induced by the agents
choice, i.e. the cost of opened facilities plus connections costs. Two of the most important
concepts for efficiency analysis are the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability
(PoS). The PoA is the ratio between a Nash equilibrium with worst possible social cost and
the strategy profile with optimal social cost, while the PoS is the ratio between the best
possible Nash equilibrium to the social optimum. In the facility location games analysed in
this survey, the optimum social cost is the cost of an optimum solution for the correspondent
optimization version of the problem.
One variation of a facility location game occurs when clients behave selfishly connec-
ting to facilities opened by a central authority. If the central authority is aware of the exact
location or connection costs of each client, then the problem is equal to the one presented in
Definition 1. However, when clients may lie to the central authority about their location, there
is a need for such authority to design mechanisms encouraging clients to be truthful. There
have been several advancements in this area of mechanism design, in particular on strategy-
proof mechanisms for these games, with seminal papers by Pal and Tardos [3], Devanur et
al. [4, 5] and Leonardi and Schäfer [6] as well as complementary works [7, 8, 9].
Another variant of a facility location game considers a cooperative game, where a
solution is going to be constructed attending all the players which are the terminals. The
problem is how to split the solution cost among all players in such a way that no coalition of
players has incentive to leave the grand coalition and form a new solution. This problem was
studied by Goemans and Skutella [10] and later in the book Algorithmic Game Theory [11]
(Chapter 15), with several related results presented.
These previous versions of facility location games are based on the fact that a central
authority is partially present in the problem. Nonetheless, when no authority is dictating
where each facility is located, several traditional games may be formed. One possibility is
when facilities and clients are controlled by players. The facility players set operating prices
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for clients, and these last ones behave selfishly, always choosing to connect to the cheapest
option available. Games with these premises have been studied by Vetta [12] as valid utility
games. Vetta demonstrated that such games always have a pure Nash equilibrium and also
showed bounds on the price of anarchy. Later this subject was also covered in the book
Algorithmic Game Theory [11] (Chapter 19), and several results for variants of the game are
explored in other works [13, 14, 15].
Despite these other versions of facility games the most natural game that arises from
facility location problems occurs when players control terminals with the need to connect to
a facility. In this case terminals connected to a facility share its opening cost and each player
wants to minimize his own total cost. How players share the facility opening costs may vary
depending on the specific version of the game being analyzed. When there is no rules on
how to share opening costs, some important results have been presented by [16]. However,
few direct results have been presented for other variants of this game, with most results being
adaptations from other problems such as the network design problem [17]. Therefore, our fo-
cus in this work is to study Facility Location games when terminals are controlled by players.
We are interested in how much this behaviour may hamper the system cost when compared
to the system optimum, both optimistically by considering the Price of Stability of games and
pessimistically, with the Price of Anarchy. Furthermore, we adapt and present results from
the literature for games where players are not completely selfish in their behaviour.
2 Contributions and Text Organization
In this paper we present a survey on several variants of the facility location game where
players control terminals and each player wants to minimize his opening and connection
costs. Some of the results were presented in other papers, some of them were presented for
related problems and we show how to adapt these results for the facility location. In Section 3,
we summarize results for facility location games with no cost sharing rules, mainly from
Cardinal and Hoefer [16, 18]. In Section 4, results from network design [17] are adapted to
fair cost facility location games, and a short compilation of results for the weighted version of
the game is presented. In Section 5, capacity restrictions are added to the previously analyzed
games and pure Nash equilibria existence and bounds for PoA and PoS are summarized
from previous work from Rodrigues and Xavier [19]. Altruism in facility location games is
explored in Section 6, where we adapted results for the cost sharing game [20] to facility
location games. In each of these sections we discuss the case where instances of the game
satisfies the triangle inequality as well. Conclusions and open problems are presented in
Section 7.
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3 Facility Location without cost sharing rules
This facility location game can model several practical scenarios. Imagine a situation
where some groups are interested in constructing public goods, such as libraries or museums.
There is no defined rule on how these groups share the construction costs, and opened facili-
ties do not have ties to the groups which helped build them, being available to anyone willing
to use them. These scenarios may be modeled using a game where players controls terminals
and need to connect to an opened facility, there being no opening cost sharing rule.
Definition 2 (Facility Location Game without Cost Sharing Rules (FLG)). Let (G = (T ∪
F, T ×F ), k, c, d) be an instance of the FLG, where G is a bipartite graph with vertex sets F
of n facilities and T of m terminals, k is the number of players and c and d are opening and
connection costs, respectively.
Each facility f ∈ F has an opening cost cf , and connection costs dtf for each terminal
t ∈ T . In games with general distance costs, some connections (t, f) should be avoided in
any solution, because they don’t exist for example. In this case we assume they have a
prohibitively large constant cost Ud. When a connection is not shown, it is assumed that it
has a cost equal to Ud, unless mentioned otherwise.
Each player i ∈ [1, . . . , k] controls a subset of terminals Ti ⊆ T . These subsets form
a partition of T , i.e, each terminal from T is controlled by some player and Ti ∩ Tj = ∅ for
i, j ∈ [1, . . . , k] with i 6= j. Each terminal must be connected to exactly one opened facility.
Each possible strategy Si of player i, is composed of a payment function pci : F → R+0
indicating how much he offers for opening a facility, as well as a function pdi : T × F → R+0





i (f) be the total paid by players for a facility f . If p
c(f) is
greater than or equal to the cost cf , then the facility f is considered opened. Likewise, if the
total offered for connection cost of a terminal-facility pair t, f is greater than or equal to dtf
then the connection is bought. Each player tries to minimize their payments while ensuring
that the terminals they control are connected to an opened facility.
Solutions where terminals do not pay enough to open the facility they are connected
to should be avoided. To avoid such solutions we add a prohibitively large constant cost Uc to
the payment of terminals in such situations. For a player i, if there is a connection (t, f) ∈ Si
where pc(f) < cf , a prohibitively large constant cost Uc > Ud is added to the total amount
paid by i, i.e, he pays pi(S) + Uc.
Note that there is no rule on how players share the costs to open a facility. Therefore,
how players share these costs may depend on which player need the facility the most and
in how the equilibrium is reached. Consider the game in Figure 1, with two players, each
controlling one terminal. One possible strategy is t1 offers 1 to f1, while t2 offers 1 to f3.
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There is no incentive to any player to change their payment scheme, and thus they are in an
equilibrium. Suppose now that t1 chooses instead, as his payment function, to offer 0.75 to
facility f2 and zero to the others, while t2 chooses to only pay 1 to f3. The player controlling
t2 then has an incentive to change his strategy to pay 0.75 to open f2. This strategy profile
is an equilibrium in which both players share equally the opening costs of f2. However, if t1
had offered only 0.5+ε to f2, t2 would still pay less by offering to pay the remaining opening
cost of f2. In fact, there is an infinite number of possible equilibria in this example, since a
player may offer to pay for the opening costs of f2 any amount in the interval (0.5, 1.0] and
the other player will, in an equilibrium, complete the offer to open f2.
t1 t2
f1 f2 f3
cf1 = 1 cf2 = 1.5 cf3 = 1
Figura 1. A example of a Facility Location Game. Connection costs are constant.
In [16], Cardinal and Hoefer analyzed a class of covering games which includes FLG
and answer a few fundamental questions about it. They proved that there may be instances of
FLG with no PNE, also showing that it is NP-Complete to determine whether an instance of
FLG has an equilibrium or not. Furthermore, they provided bounds on the Price of Anarchy
and Stability for the FLG for the instances that admit equilibria. They also presented appro-
ximation algorithms to find an approximated equilibrium based on a well known primal-dual
algorithm for the facility location problem. We shortly summarize some of these results be-
low.
Theorem 1 (Pure Nash Equilibrium existence for FLG [16]). There are instances of the FLG
where there is no PNE. Moreover it is NP-hard to decide if an instance of the FLG admits a
PNE or not
Demonstração. Consider the instance of FLG showed in Figure 2. Player A controls terminal
t1, while player B controls terminals t2 and t3. For all edges shown the connection costs are
zero, and infinite otherwise. Suppose facility f1 is opened. Either A or B paid completely
for it, or they shared the costs in some manner. If B paid fully, player A do not need to
pay anything to fulfil his constraints, and B would need to pay for either f2 or f3 to attend
terminal t2. In this case, B would pay less by not opening f1 and instead only paying for f3
for a total payment of 1 + ε. However, player A would then need to pay fully for f1 or f2,
which would make B chooses to use both f1 and f2, foregoing f3 since it would only need
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to open one facility with total cost equal to 1. Player A would be free in this scenario to not
pay for any facility, choosing to connect to the one B opened, and completing a best response
cycle. The same occurs when they initially share the costs of f1, since B would either choose











Figura 2. A game instance for the FLG with no PNE, first described in [16]. Letters next to
terminals indicate which player controls the terminal.
To determine whether the FLG game does have or not a PNE is NP-Hard. As detailed
in [16], the 3-SAT problem [21] can be reduced to this problem.
When restricted to instances of the game that admits PNE, Cardinal and Hoefer [16]
show that the price of anarchy of FLG is k, the number of players. The social cost C(S) for












pdi (t, f) .
Theorem 2 (Price of Anarchy of FLG [16]). The price of anarchy for any FLG instance that
admits PNE is at most k, and there is an instance of FLG with price of anarchy of at least k.
Demonstração. Suppose that there is an equilibrium S which is more than k times the cost
of a strategy profile S∗ with optimal social cost. Then, at least one player in S is paying more
than C(S∗) to cover his terminals. This player could then simply offer the optimal solution
S∗ as his own payment scheme, and therefore reach a better solution, which means that S is
not an equilibrium. Thus, PoA ≤ k.
Now consider the game of Figure 3, where each terminal is controlled by a different
player, and two facilities, f1 with opening cost 1, and f2 with opening cost k, with no con-
nection costs. The optimal solution is clearly to connect each terminal to f1 with total cost 1.
66 R. Inform. Teór. Apl. (Online) • Porto Alegre • v. 24 • n. 1 • p. 59-90 • 2017





b b bt1 t2 tk−1 tk
Figura 3. A game instance of the FLG with PoA equal to k.
However, the strategy profile where each player is connected to f2 paying 1 to open it, is an
equilibrium with total cost of k. Therefore, the Price of Anarchy of FLG is k.
By exploiting the fact that there are instances with no equilibrium, Cardinal and Ho-
efer showed an instance of the game where the Price of Stability is close to the Price of
Anarchy.
Theorem 3 (Price of Stability of FLG [16]). There is an instance of the FLG with price of
stability of at least k − 2.
Demonstração. Consider the game in Figure 4, where player 1 controls terminal t1, player
2 controls terminals t2 and t3, and player i ∈ [3, k] controls terminal ti+1. Each player i
from 3 to k can connect to the center facility fk+1 with connection cost ε and opening cost
1, as well as their “leaf” facility fi with connection cost 1 and opening cost ε. Note that
the instance induced by players 1 and 2 is very similar to the one in Figure 2, and also does
not have by itself an equilibrium. Clearly, the optimal solution is the one where players 1
and 2 connect to f1 and f2, while the remaining players all connect to fk+1, with total cost
1 + (k − 2)ε+ 5ε = 1 + (k + 3)ε.
If any player chooses to open the center facility fk+1, all other players will eventually
connect to the center as well, with the exception of players 1 and 2 which would never reach
an equilibrium (see Theorem 1). So in order to exist an equilibrium, player 3 must connect
to f3 paying some value in [ε/2, ε] of the facility cost (say ε/2). Then player 2 pays the
remaining cost, say ε, connecting both of its terminals to f3. It is easy to check that this
is a best equilibrium. Therefore each player i ∈ [4, . . . , k] fully pays for facility fi, each
paying a connection cost of 1 and opening cost of ε. Player 3 pays a connection cost of 1 to
f3 and ε/2 of its opening cost. Finally, player 1 will pay 2ε for opening and connecting its
terminal to either f1 or f2, and player 2 will pay 3ε including connection costs to f3 and the
remaining opening cost. The total cost for this equilibrium is (k − 3)(1 + ε) + 1 + 5.5ε =
(k − 2)(1 + ε) + 4.5ε. Therefore, when ε tends to 0, the price of stability of this instance
tends to k − 2.
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Figura 4. A game instance of the FLG with PoS of k − 2, first described in [16]. Dashed
lines have connection cost ε, while full lines have cost 1. Numbers next to terminals indicate
which player controls the terminal.
3.1 The Metric FLG
For the metric version of the FLG, where connection costs satisfies the triangle ine-
quality, all results of Theorems 1, 2 and 3 still hold. All instances used in these Theorems
can be safely modified to have the additional required connections respecting the triangle
inequality without changing the optimal solutions and the possible pure equilibria.
Theorem 4 (Pure Nash Equilibrium existence for the Metric FLG [16]). There are instances
of the Metric FLG where there is no PNE.
Demonstração. Consider the instance of Figure 2 adding the following edge costs: each
drawn edge has cost equal to 1 and each not drawn edge between terminals and facilities has
cost equal to 3. The same arguments of Theorem 1 works for this metric instance.
Theorem 5 (Price of Anarchy of the Metric FLG). The price of anarchy for any Metric FLG
instance that admits PNE is at most k, and there is an instance of the Metric FLG with price
of anarchy of at least k.
Demonstração. We can use the same arguments of Theorem 2 using the instance of Figure 3
with a constant cost c to each edge.
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Theorem 6 (Price of Stability of the Metric FLG [16]). There is an instance of the Metric
FLG with price of stability of at least k − 2.
Demonstração. Consider the instance of Figure 4 by completing the graph with edges between
each pair of vertices with cost equal to the cost of the shortest path between them. We can use
the same arguments of Theorem 3 because the cost of the new connections between facilities
and terminals are higher than the ones presented in the Figure.
Note that both the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability have similar values for
this class of games, indicating a large gap between equilibria and social optima. However, in
all theorems seen so far, the fact that players do not have a clear way to share facility opening
costs plays a major role in making such big differences between the optimal welfare and pure
equilibria. If global sharing rules for costs are considered, this gap, and the undesirable fact
of the nonexistence of pure equilibria in some games may change as we will see in Section 4.
4 Facility Location with Fair Cost Sharing
In this section, we consider facility location games where, instead of players freely
coordinating on how to share facilities’ opening costs, they are forced to equally share the
costs for each facility they want to open. The game is defined in a similar way as in Section 3,
since the only change is in how the players share the facilities opening costs.
Definition 3 (Facility Location Game with Fair Cost sharing (FLG-FC)). Let G = (T ∪
F, T × F ) be a bipartite graph, with vertex sets F of n facilities and T of m terminals. Each
facility f ∈ F has an opening cost cf , and connection costs dtf for each terminal t ∈ T . Let
K = [1, . . . , k] be the set of players. Each player i controls a subset of terminals Ti ⊆ T
(also forming a partition of T ), and each terminal must be connected to exactly one opened
facility. A player i chooses a strategy Si ⊂ Ti × F .
Let S = (S1, ..., Sk) be a strategy profile and U(S) =
⋃
i∈K Si be the set of all
strategies chosen by players in S. We use the expression f ∈ U(S) to represent all facilities
connected to a terminal in a strategy profile S, while f ∈ Si represents all facilities player i










where xf (S) = |{1 ≤ i ≤ k : f ∈ Si}| is the number of players using facility f in
strategy profile S.
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This game can be seen as a specialization of Network Design, first defined and explo-
red in [17]. In the Network Design Game, it is given a graph G = (V,E), where each player
i has a set of terminal nodes Ti which he needs to connect, and his strategy is a set of edges
Si ⊂ E which must form a tree connecting all nodes in Ti. Each edge e has an opening cost
ce associated with it, and players who use this edge share its cost equally.
Theorem 7 (PNE existence for FLG-FC). Every instance of the FLG-FC game admits a
PNE.
Demonstração. For the network design game, it was proved in [17] that the game always









where xe is the number of players which have the edge e in the strategy profile S.
A similar proof of the existence of PNE is possible for the Facility Location with Fair












where (t, f) ∈ U(S) is a pair terminal–facility used in the strategy profile S, and xf (S) is
the number of players sharing facility f in S. Since FLG admits this potential function and
is therefore a potential game, it must always posses a PNE.
We can use similar arguments to the ones used in Theorem 2 to show that the Price of
Anarchy of the FLG-FC is equal to k, the number of players.
Theorem 8 (Price of Anarchy for FLG-FC). The Price of Anarchy of the FLG-FC is k.










i , S−i) (3)
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is true since S is a PNE. Now for player i, we have that
pi(S
∗





























= k · pi(S∗) .
This must hold since xf (S∗i , S−i) is at least one for any connected facility f in S
∗
i ,
while xf (S∗) can be at most k for a facility f in the social optimum S∗. Applying this to the





















= k · C(S∗) .
To see that this bound is tight, refer to the instance used in Theorem 2 for FLG, shown
in Figure 3. Since all players share evenly the cost for facility f2 in the worst PNE for FLG,
this equilibrium still occurs in FLG-FC, and therefore the PoA for this instance is also at least
k for FLG-FC.
As for the Price of Stability, Anshelevich et. al [17] proved that for the network design
game there is an upper bound ofHk = 1+ 12 +· · ·+ 1k . We can do a similar proof for FLG-FC
obtaining the same bound and we can also show that this bound is tight.
Theorem 9 (Price of Stability for FLG-FC (Adapted from [17])). Consider a facility location
game with fair cost sharing (FLG-FC) with nondecreasing concave opening cost cf for each
facility f and connection costs dtf for pairs of terminal-facility (t, f). Then the Price of
Stability is Hk, where k is the number of players of the game .
Demonstração. Let Φ(S) be the potential function defined in Equation 2. Let S∗ be a strategy
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Since FLG-FC is a potential game, we can start the game using the strategy profile
S∗ and let each player chooses a best response strategy in a series of rounds. After a finite
number of rounds the game will reach a PNE S with Φ(S) ≤ Φ(S∗). For any strategy profile
S′, Φ(S′) ≥ C(S′) and therefore
C(S) ≤ Φ(S) ≤ Φ(S∗) ≤ HkC(S∗) .




To see that this bound is tight, consider the example in Figure 5. In this game with
n = k + 1 facilities and m = k terminals each player i ≤ k controls terminal ti. Clearly
the solution with optimal social welfare is the one where all players open facility fk+1 with a
total cost of 1 + ε. However, this strategy profile is not an equilibrium, since player k would
be able to pay less by opening facility fk. This change in strategy from player k consequently
would cause player k − 1 to also change his strategy to open facility fk−1, which ultimately
would cause all players to choose to not open fk+1, resulting in an equilibrium of total cost
1 + 12 + ... +
1
k = Hk. This strategy profile is the only possible equilibrium, since every
terminal must connect to a facility and there is no equilibrium in which facility fk+1 is open.
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cfk+1 = 1 + ε
Figura 5. Game instance of the FLG-FC with PoS of Hk. All edges have cost equal to zero.
4.1 The Metric FLG-FC
For the metric version of FLG-FC we can use the same potential function of Theorem
7 since no assumption is made about the connection costs. So every instance of the metric
FLG-FC also admits a PNE.
Theorem 10 (PNE existence for the Metric FLG-FC). Every instance of the Metric FLG-FC
game admits a PNE.
The PoA bound is still the number of players k.
Theorem 11 (Price of Anarchy for the Metric FLG-FC). The Price of Anarchy of the Metric
FLG-FC is k.
Demonstração. The same arguments of Theorem 8 works by considering the instance of
Figure 3 with edges cost equal to some constant c > 0.
The upper bound of Hk on the PoS proved in Theorem 9 still works for the metric
case since it is derived from the potential function. On the other hand, the lower bound
obtained from the instance of Figure 5 does not work anymore. By adding edges respecting
the triangle inequality for that instance both the optimal solution and equilibria change since
now all terminals can connect to any facility. In fact, Hansen and Telelis in [22] proved a
constant upper bound of 2.36 for the PoS of the metric FLG-FC, and also proving a lower
bound of 1.45.
Theorem 12 (Price of Stability for the Metric FLG-FC [22]). The Price of Stability of the
Metric FLG-FC is at most 2.36 and at least 1.45.
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4.2 Weighted Players
Suppose a Facility Location game where players have different demands. Suppose
player i demands wi units of some good while player j demands wj . When sharing the cost
of a common facility, this cost should be divided considering these demands.
The facility location game with fair cost sharing can be extended for cases where
players may pay a larger or smaller fraction of opening costs for facilities. This is accom-
plished by changing the cost calculation function by adding weights for each player. Now











where Wf,S is the sum of the weights of all players using f in the strategy profile S.
This extension has been studied by Hansen and Telelis [23, 22]. They prove that
e-approximate equilibria exists, i.e. there is a strategy profile S where each player cannot
improve by more than a factor e from what he is paying in S. Furthermore, a bound for both
the PoA and PoS of Θ(logW ) is shown, where W is the sum of all player weights.
The Network Design Game with weights was also explored in the literature, particu-
larly by Chen and Roughgarden in [24]. In this paper, the authors proved that this variant
do not always have a Pure Nash Equilibrium. However, this proof does not translate direc-
tly to the facility location game with weighted players. It is currently an open problem if
this version of the Facility Location game always have a Pure Nash Equilibrium. The proof
of Theorem 7 using a potential function do not apply to this variant, since the addition of
weights for FLG-FC turns that function not potential.
5 Facility Location Games with Capacities
It is not always possible for a facility to provide goods for an unlimited number of
terminals. Therefore, extended versions of facility location games where the facilities have
limited capacities are also of interest. In the most natural extension, every facility f has a
capacity uf associated with it, which indicates how many terminals can be connected to this
facility.
This kind of capacitated game has been recently studied by Rodrigues and Xavier [19],
where the authors proved several results concerning both the existence of equilibria and its
quality.
For capacitated games with no cost sharing rules, it can be shown that even when all
players are singletons, i.e. each player controls only one terminal, there are still games with
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no equilibria [19], as is exemplified in Figure 6.
Theorem 13 (PNE for the Capacitated FLG [19]). There are instances of the Capacitated
FLG that do not admit PNE, even when restricted to singleton players.
t1
f1






Figura 6. Game instance of the Capacitated FLG without a PNE. Connection costs have a
constant value.
Furthermore, Rodrigues and Xavier [19] proved that even when all players are single-
tons, deciding whether an instance of capacitated FLG has a PNE or not is NP-hard.
Theorem 14 (PNE existence is NP-hard [19]). It is NP-hard to determine if an instance of the
metric capacitated FLG has a PNE or not. When restricted to instances with only singleton
players, it is NP-complete to determine if an instance of the metric capacitated FLG has a
PNE.
Now consider the game with fair cost sharing. The same potential function of Theorem
7 can be used for the capacitated FLG-FC game, so it always admits PNE.
Theorem 15 (PNE for the Capacitated FLG-FC). All instances of the Capacitated FLG-FC
admit PNE.
All examples seen in previous Sections can be modified to have capacities, by setting
the capacity of each facility equal to the number of terminals. Thus, the price of anarchy is
at least the number of players k for this new game. However, with capacities it can be shown
that the PoA is unbounded, even in the case of fair cost sharing. As Figure 7 shows, there are
instances with unbounded equilibria.
Theorem 16 (Price of Anarchy for Capacitated Facility Location [19]). The PoA for the Ca-
pacitated FLG-FC is unbounded. For the Capacitated FLG, there are instances that admits
a PNE but whose PoA is unbounded.
In Figure 7 if t2 connects to f2 then t1 is forced to connect to f1 paying an unbounded
opening cost. Note that the instance in Figure 7 works for capacitated FLG and capacitated
FLG-FC as well, since each facility can attend at most one terminal.
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Figura 7. Game instance of the FLG and FLG-FC with unbounded Price of Anarchy.
As for the price of stability, for games with fair cost sharing it remains a potential
game with the same potential function. Thus, Theorem 9 still applies, leading to a Hk bound
for the PoS.
Theorem 17 (Price of Stability for Capacitated FLG-FC [19]). The PoS for the Capacitated
FLG-FC is Hk, where k is the number of players of the game.
On the other hand for games with no cost sharing rules, Rodrigues and Xavier [19]
proved that there are games with unbounded price of stability.
Theorem 18 (Price of Stability for Capacitated FLG [19]). There are instances of the Capa-
citated FLG that admits PNE but have unbounded PoS.
Instead of dealing directly with capacities, there is also a possibility of a softer appro-
ach. For example we can consider a game where the player cost function has an additional
cost that increases with the number terminals using a same facility. In this variant, the cost of
a terminal t connecting to a facility f is defined as cfxf +g(xf ) +dtf , where xf is the number
of terminals connected to f .
If the added cost function g(x) is monotone increasing, and the opening function
cost cf (x) is monotone increasing and concave then Anshelevich et. al [17] proved for the
network design game, that the PoS is bounded by A×Hk. The parameter A depends on the
type of the function g. For functions with polynomial degree at most l, this term is equal to
l + 1. This bound extends for the facility location game with fair cost sharing and with the
additional g(x) costs. This occurs because the proof for such bound is based on the potential
function of the network design game, and the distance costs dtf that appear in the facility
location game do not interfere in the proof presented in [17].
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5.1 The Metric Version of Capacitated FL Games
A common restriction for location games is to require all connections to obey the
triangle inequality. This restriction do not affect the proof of instances with no PNE in Theo-
rem 13, since the instance used there is metric.
Theorem 19 (PNE for the Metric Capacitated FLG [19]). There are instances of the Metric
Capacitated FLG that do not admit PNE, even when restricted to singleton players.
For the Metric Capacitated FLG-FC, the same potential function of Theorem 7 can be
used to show the existence of PNE.
Theorem 20 (PNE for the Metric Capacitated FLG-FC). All instances of the Metric Capaci-
tated FLG-FC admit PNE.
On the other hand, the restriction that instances are metric invalidates the example
from Figure 7. Nonetheless, there are other more contrived instances that respect the triangle
inequality and yet has unbounded PoA [19].
Theorem 21 (Price of Anarchy for Metric Capacitated FLG and FLG-FC [19]). The PoA for
the Metric Capacitated FLG-FC is unbounded. For the Metric Capacitated FLG, there are
instances that admit PNE but have PoA unbounded.
These instances explore the fact that players move simultaneously when represented
in normal form. When sequentiality [25] is considered, Rodrigues and Xavier [19] prove that
the PoA for Metric Capacitated FLG has a bound of Θ(2k).
For facility location games, and specially for the capacitated version, it is useful to
consider what changes when these games are sequential [25]. To analyze these scenarios, the
concept of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is used instead of PNE. When represented in
the extensive form, games use a tree where each node represents a player and edges represent
possible strategies from players. SPE is defined as a strategy profile which is a PNE in every
subgame of this tree, so a SPE is also a PNE for the entire game. The Sequential Price
of Anarchy (SPoA) is defined as the ratio between the cost of the worst subgame perfect
equilibrium and the optimal social cost, while the Sequential Price of Stability (SPoS) is the
ratio between the best SPE and the optimal social cost.
With these concepts in mind, it can be shown that the SPoA for Metric CFLG and
CFLG-FC is in ϑ(2k).
Theorem 22 (SPoA for Metric CFLG and Metric FLG-FC [19]). Consider an instance of
the Metric CFLG-FC and Metric CFLG game with k players where
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• each player i controls one terminal ti,
• players play in order 1, . . . , k, where player i knows every action taken by players
1, . . . , i− 1,
• S is the sub-game perfect equilibrium reached and S∗ is a solution with optimum social
cost.
Then the SPoA ≤ 2k and this bound is tight.
To have some intuition on why this is the case, consider instance shown in Figure 8.
Allow each player to control a single terminal. Suppose terminals play in order t1, . . . , tk.
The social optimal clearly happens when any terminal ti connects to fi, resulting in a social
cost of one. However, there exists another equilibrium where each terminal ti connects to
fi+1, since for t1 both f1 and f2 have the same cost. Such PNE has cost 20+21+. . .+2k−1 =
2k, and therefore the SPoA is 2k.
b b b b b




bc0bc . . .t1 t2 t3 t4 tk
cf1 = 1
f1 f2 f3 f4 fk fk+1











Figura 8. Metric Capacitated FLG instance with SPoA equal to 2k [19]. Connections not
shown have cost equal to the shortest path, and each facility has unitary capacity restrictions.
As for the Price of Stability, for fair cost games Rodrigues and Xavier [19] adapt
the instance depicted in Figure 5 to respect the triangle inequality by allowing terminals to
connect to any facility at no cost, but restricting facilities f1 to fk to connect to only one
terminal, as shown in Figure 9.
Theorem 23 (PoS for Metric CFLG-FC [19]). For the Metric CFLG-FC the Price of Stability
is Hk, where k is the number of players of the game.
For the Capacitated FLG, it can be shown by a similar process as used in Theorem 3
that the PoS is Ω(2k), as is depicted in Figure 10. Let each player control a single terminal.
In order for a PNE to be possible, terminal fa must have at least some of its cost paid by
terminal tk. Therefore, there needs to be another terminal tk+1 blocking fk, which will only
happen when t1 connects to f2, terminal t2 to f3 and so on.
Theorem 24 (PoS for the Metric CFLG [19]). There are instances of the Metric Capacitated
FLG that admit a PNE and have a PoS in Ω(2k).
78 R. Inform. Teór. Apl. (Online) • Porto Alegre • v. 24 • n. 1 • p. 59-90 • 2017
Jogos Não Cooperativos de Localização de Instalações: uma Resenha
b b b
b b bf1 f2 fk−1 fk
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cfk+1 = 1 + ε
ufk+1 = k
uf1 = 1 uf2 = 1 ufk−1 = 1 ufk = 1
b b b
Figura 9. Game instance of the Metric CFLG-FC with PoS of Hk [19]. Each connection has
zero cost and the graph is complete. Facilities f1, . . . , fk have unitary capacities, while fk+1
has capacity k.
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Figura 10. Metric Capacitated FLG instance with PoS equal to Θ(2k) [19].
6 Altruism in Facility Location Games
All analysis seen so far for facility location games assume that players are comple-
tely selfish. However, this assumption does not always reflect what happens in practice.
Players’ behavior in practice may be at least partially altruistic [26, 27], indicating a need
to incorporate this alternate behavior for games modeling real world scenarios. In light of
this, in recent years there has been increasing interest in the study of alternate models on how
players behave. A model for altruistic behavior is presented by Chen et al. [20]. It changes
how players perceive utility by adding a αi parameter for each player i indicating how selfless
a player behaves.
Definition 4 (Altruism). Let G = (K,S, (pi)i∈K) be a cost minimization game, where
K = [k] is the set of k players, S = A1 × . . .×Ak is the set of all possible strategy profiles
where Ai is the set of actions (set of pure strategies) of player i. The payment function
pi : S → R defines the cost of a strategy profile for player i.
The α-altruistic extension of G, for α ∈ [0, 1]k, is defined as the game Gα =
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(K,S, (pαi )i∈K), where for every player i and strategy profile S ∈ S,
pαi (S) = (1− αi)pi(S) + αiC(S) , (4)
where C : S → R is a function defining the social cost of strategy profile S. This function
must satisfy the property that for any S ∈ S, C(S) ≤∑i∈K pi(S).
The function pαi (S) represents the perceived cost of a strategy profile S for a player i.
Note that using this model, when αi is zero, player i is completely selfish, while a player i is
completely altruistic when αi = 1. Therefore, if α = [0]k, the α-altruistic extension Gα is
equal to the original game G. We say that a game Gα is uniformly α-altruistic when for any
player i, αi = α.
Chen et al. in [28] analyzed a few classes of games using this altruistic model. Their
analysis extends the definition of smooth games to incorporate altruism. Before using their
model, we present some important definitions for smooth games [29].
6.1 Smooth Games and Altruism
The notion of smooth games, first defined by Roughgarden in [29], is an important
tool in the analysis of inefficiency in games. It provides bounds not only for pure and mixed
equilibria, but also for both correlated and coarse correlated equilibria [30].
Definition 5 (Smooth Games). A cost minimization game G = (K,S, (pi)i∈K) is (λ, µ)–





i , S−i) ≤ λ · C(S∗) + µ · C(S). (5)
where C : S → R is again mapping strategy profiles to social costs such that for any
S ∈ S, C(S) ≤∑i∈K pi(S).
If a minimization game is (λ, µ)–smooth then it is possible to assert several facts about
such game. Among them, a bound for the price of anarchy. If a game is (λ, µ)–smooth, with
(λ ≥ 0 and µ < 1), then every equilibria S has cost at most λ1−µ times that of a social optimal
solution S∗.
The robust price of anarchy is defined as the best upper bound that is possible to prove
using smoothness analysis.
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Definition 6 (Robust Price of Anarchy). The robust price of anarchy of a cost-minimization




1− µ : (λ, µ) s.t. the game is (λ, µ)-smooth
}
, (6)
where λ ≥ 0 and µ < 1.
Definition 5 can be relaxed by allowing the inequality to hold only for an optimal
solution S∗ and all other strategy profiles S, while still retaining the properties based on
the smoothness property [29]. Note that we already used this type of analysis to prove PoA
bounds for FC-FLG in Theorem 8, with an implicit use of λ of k and a µ of zero.
In [20], the definition of smooth games is extended to incorporate altruism, while
maintaining most of the properties proved for the original concept.
Definition 7 ((λ, µ, α)-smoothness). LetGα be an α-altruistic game with social cost function







i , S−i) + αi(C−i(S
∗
i , S−i)− C−i(S))
]
≤ λC(S∗) + µC(S) , (7)
where C−i(S) = C(S)− pi(S) and for any S, C(S) ≤
∑
i∈K pi(S).
If a game is (λ, µ, α)-smooth with µ < 1, then the price of anarchy of the game is at
most λ1−µ , even for coarse correlated equilibria.
6.2 Fair Cost Sharing Games with Altruism
A similar game to the Facility Location Game with Fair Cost sharing (FLG-FC) seen
in Section 4, denominated Fair-Cost Sharing Game, has been considered in [20]. In this
game, there are no connection costs between terminals and facilities. Furthermore, while in
the FLG-FC each terminal may choose any facility to open, in the Fair-Cost Sharing Game
each player has to connect his clients to some subset of facilities given as an input to the
game. Below we adapt the results in [20] to the FLG-FC game.
Recall the FLG-FC specified in Definition 3. Here we use d(Si) =
∑
(t,f)∈Si dtf as
the sum of all connection costs for a player i in strategy Si, and U(S) =
⋃
i∈K Si as the set
with all strategies in the strategy profile S.
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Theorem 25 (Altruistic FLG-FC smoothness (Adapted from [20])). For any FLG-FC game
G with k players, the α–altruistic extension Gα is (k, αˆ, α)–smooth, where αˆ = maxi∈K αi.
Demonstração. Let S and S∗ be two strategy profiles forG, with social cost functionC(S) =∑
f∈U(S) cf +
∑
j∈K d(Sj). Fix an arbitrary player i ∈ K. Then,





















This inequality can be used to establish the following bound:






















xf (S∗i , S−i)







The last inequality follows from the fact that xf (S∗i , S−i) ≥ 1 and xf (S∗i , S−i) ≥
xf (S
∗)/k for every f ∈ S∗i .
From this, we can conclude that the game is (k, αˆ, α)–smooth as defined in Defini-
tion 7:
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kC(S∗) + αˆC(S) .
Corollary 1 (Robust Price of Anarchy for α-altruistic FLG-FC (Adapted from [20])). The
robust price of anarchy (RPoA) of the α-altruistic FLG-FC game is at most k1−αˆ , where
αˆ = maxi∈P αi, and there is an α-altruistic instance of the FLG-FC with a RPoA of k1−αˆ .
Demonstração. As seen in Theorem 25, for any instance G of the FLG-FC game, the α-









b b bt1 t2 tk−1 tk
Figura 11. Instance of FLG-FC with PoA equal to k1−α where every player is α-altruistic,
first described in [20]. Connections cost are equal to zero.
To show that this bound is tight, even for pure Nash equilibria, we can slightly alter
the example of Figure 3. Instead of a facility with cost equal to the number of players,
we now have a facility with cost k1−α , with every player being uniformly α-altruistic, as
shown in Figure 11. In this instance each player i ∈ [1, k] controls a terminal ti, and can
choose between facilities f1 with cost 1 and f2 with cost k1−α . Consider the strategy profile
S∗ = ((t1, f1), ..., (tk, f1)) where every player chooses f1 and S = ((t1, f2), ..., (tk, f2))
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where f2 is chosen by all players. Clearly S∗ is the strategy profile with optimal social cost,
with C(S∗) = 1, while S has cost C(S) = k1−α . The strategy profile S is a PNE of the
uniformly α-altruistic extension Gα, since for any player i,
pαi (S) = (1− α)pi(S) + αC(S) = 1 + α
k
1− α = p
α
i ((ti, f1), S−i) .
Therefore, the price of anarchy of Gα is at least k1−α , and the bound for the robust price of
anarchy for the α-altruistic extension of FLG-FC is tight.
The PoS for uniformly α-altruistic games can be determined in a similar way as was
done in Theorem 9, for a bound of (1− α)Hk + α.
Theorem 26 (Price of Stability for α-altruistic FLG-FC (Adapted from [20])). The Price of
Stability for uniformly α-altruistic fair cost facility location games is at most (1−α)Hk +α.
Demonstração. Let Gα be an uniformly α-altruistic facility location game. Then it is a
potential game with potential function




































((1− α)Hk + α)C(S) .
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Let S∗ be the social optimum strategy profile. From this strategy, we can derive an
equilibrium S by best response dynamics such that Φα(S∗) ≥ Φα(S). SinceC(S) ≤ Φα(S),
we have
C(S) ≤ Φα(S) ≤ Φα(S∗) ≤ ((1− α)Hk + α)C(S∗) ,
which means that the price of stability is at most ((1− α)Hk + α).
We note that in this section a tight bound of a linear function of k was given for the
robust price of anarchy, while for the price of stability a considerably more restricted bound
was proven (considering only games with uniform altruism). It is possible that this bound can
indeed be much closer to the optimal social welfare if completely altruistic players are mixed
with selfish players. For example, in the instance in Figure 5, used to prove the tightness
of the bound Hk for the PoS of FLG-FC, if the player controlling terminal tk is completely
altruistic, the best PNE is the optimal solution.
Another variant not taken in consideration for the altruistic extension is the metric
case, where any terminal can be connected to any facility and connection costs are bounded
by the triangle inequality. Clearly the bound for the PoA for α-altruistic FLG-FC holds for
the metric variant, since connection costs are not important in Theorem 25 and the instance
in Figure 11. However while the bound for the PoS is still valid, it may be that for the metric
variant a better PoS for α-altruistic FLG-FC is possible.
We analyzed in this section altruistic versions of the FLG-FC game. It remains an
open problem to explore altruism for the facility location game without cost sharing rules. An
interesting question for these games, where there are instances with no pure Nash equilibria,
is whether a certain amount of altruism in the game can guarantee the existence of such
equilibrium. And if altruism can guarantee the existence of equilibrium, how this altruistic
behaviour must be distributed between the players. It may be the case that a certain amount
of completely altruistic players are needed to guarantee PNE existence, or that every player
must be at least a α amount altruistic.
7 Conclusions and Open Problems
In this survey, we combined results from several works related to facility location
games. We focused on proving existence of pure Nash equilibria and bounds for the price of
anarchy and stability.
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For facility location games without cost sharing rules, we presented results from Car-
dinal and Hoefer [16] for the uncapacitated version, and provided results from Rodrigues and
Xavier [19] for the capacitated game proving unbounded PoA, PoS and instances with no
PNE even when players control only a single terminal. For fair cost sharing facility location
games, we adapted results from Anshelevich et al. [17, 24] for the network design game. In
these proofs we needed to take in consideration the additional connection costs and show that
they do not interfere in the bounds for equilibria. For the capacitated version, Rodrigues and
Xavier [19] proved that the PoA can be worse than the uncapacitated for the metric version,
and unbounded in the general case, while the PoS has the same bound as the uncapacitated
version. Furthermore, we analyzed facility location using an altruistic model for player beha-
vior [20], and adapted recent results for the fair cost sharing games to facility location games.
A summary of the known bounds are presented in Table 1. Note that for Metric Capacitated
FLG and FLG-FC results refer to the Sequential Price of Anarchy.
Tabela 1. Known results for Facility Location Games.
Game PNE PoA PoS Reference
FLG (Facility Location Game) × k k − 2 [16]
Capacitated FLG × ∞ ∞ [19]
Metric Cap. FLG × 2k Θ(2k) [19]
FLG-FC (Fair Cost sharing) X k H(k) adapted from [17]
Metric FLG-FC X k 2.36 [22]
FLG-FC with Weights ? Θ(logW ) Θ(logW ) [23, 22]
Capacitated FLG-FC X ∞ H(k) [19]
Metric Cap. FLG-FC X 2k H(k) [19]
Altruistic FLG-FC X k
1−αˆ ((1− α)H(k) + α) adapted from [20]
While several bounds for these games can be adapted directly from network design
and fair cost games, some questions remain undiscovered. One example is the question of
the existence of PNE for weighted FLG-FC. The examples of instances with no equilibria for
network design do not translate to instances of the FLC-FG, and there is still no proof for
PNE existence.
Since the addition of hard capacities to facility location games can lead to unbounded
PoA and PoS, other models that impose capacities in facility location games may be of in-
terest. Nonetheless, few have been explored in the context of facility location. Furthermore,
while sequentiality has been investigated for capacitated facility location games [19] and for
games similar to fair cost facility location [25], to the best of our knowledge there is no results
concerning the sequential Price of Anarchy or Stability when players have no rules on how
to share opening costs.
Another interesting question is to consider altruism for facility location games outside
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of the fair cost sharing model, for example with no cost sharing rules. Several questions can
be explored with altruism, specially in games with no guaranteed equilibria.
Finally, while there are some research in altruism in the context of location games, no
results are known when spiteful behaviour from players are considered. We note however,
that there are still no completely accepted model for spiteful player behaviour. If we model
players as completely spiteful, selfish or altruistic, perhaps some results can be extended from
distributed networks, as disrupting agents may be considered completely spiteful players. If
someone models spite in a similar manner to altruism, then solution feasibility is another
possible concern.
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